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ABSTRACT
Breath has a realist function in most artistic media. It
serves to remind the reader, the viewer or the spectator
of the exigencies of the body. In science ﬁction (SF)
literature and ﬁlms, breath is often a plot device for
human encounters with otherness, either with alien
peoples, who may not breathe oxygen, or environments,
where there may not be oxygen to breathe. But while
there is a technoscientiﬁc quality to breath in SF,
especially in its attention to physiological systems,
concentrating on the technoscientiﬁc threatens to
occlude other, more affective aspects raised by the
literature. In order to supplement the tendency to read
SF as a succession of technoscientiﬁc accounts of bodily
experience, this paper recalls how SF texts draw
attention to the affective, non-scientiﬁc qualities of
breath, both as a metonym for life and as a metaphor
for anticipation. Through an engagement with diverse
examples from SF literature and ﬁlms, this article
considers the tension between technoscientiﬁc and
affective responses to breath in order to demonstrate
breath’s co-determinacy in SF’s blending of scientiﬁc and
artistic discourses.
INTRODUCTION
This article considers how breath’s affective qual-
ities may interrogate implicit claims to medical
realism in science ﬁction (SF). I argue that SF is not
constrained to impressions of technoscientiﬁc
plausibility and scientiﬁc modelling when respond-
ing to the affective experience of breathing.1 SF in
fact engages with questions of affective breathing in
provocatively non-scientiﬁc ways, even when articu-
lated through apparently scientiﬁc discourse. The
result is a tension ‘between a technoscientiﬁc
imaginary that disenchants [breath], and a sense
that human experience will always be sublimated,
because it is embodied, situated, partial, and frag-
mentary’.1 The breathing experience of SF novels
or ﬁlms always exceeds, in its affective qualities, its
bare description as scientiﬁc process. Rethinking
the affective qualities of breath in SF as they efface
respiratory medical discourse (Fahrenheit 451),
resist technical appropriation (2001: A Space
Odyssey) or recall affective experiences often for-
gotten in the scientiﬁc languages of processes (The
Abyss) can, I suggest, provide the basis for a more
useful dialogue between affective and technoscienti-
ﬁc discourses.
THE CHEYNE-STOKES RESPIRATION
OF CIVILISATION
In their February 1951 issue, Galaxy Science
Fiction published a novella by Ray Bradbury.2 The
Fireman would subsequently be expanded into the
most successful novel of Bradbury’s career,
Fahrenheit 451 (1953).3 The novel, named for the
temperature at which paper burns, signiﬁcantly
embellishes on the world of the novella, a world in
which, to facilitate the censorship of books,
‘ﬁremen’ have been retooled to set ﬁres rather than
douse them. Amidst his elaborations, however,
Bradbury omits one signiﬁcant passage. Montag,
the hero of both The Fireman and Fahrenheit 451,
convinces his wife, Mildred, to spend an afternoon
reading a pile of banned books he has secreted
away from various burnings. When she challenges
him to explain why he wants her to read the
books, at risk of personal ruin, he tells her to
‘listen’ (p. 24;2 p. 74).3 In Fahrenheit 451, this is
followed by a third-person description of bombers
crossing the sky, her listening experience captured
by a series of indirectly discursive sonic metaphors:
‘gasping, murmuring, whistling like an immense,
invisible fan, circling in emptiness’ (p. 74).3 In The
Fireman, ‘she listens’ to the bombers crossing the
sky, ‘quick gasps in the heavens, as if a running
giant had drawn his breath’, which precipitates a
meditation on the disjunction between the ever-
present sounds of the bombers and their visual
absence: ‘they had heard those jet sounds and seen
nothing, until, like the tick of a clock or a time-
bomb, it had come to be unnoticed, for it was the
sound of today, the Cheyne-Stokes respiration of
civilization’ p. 24).2 In both texts, the incursion of
the bombers will provoke Montag to an outburst
about the society’s continuous state of war and
gives rise to his suggestion that reading might lead
to a personal liberation, at least, from ‘the cave’
(Bradbury’s allusion to Plato’s ‘Allegory of the
Cave’) (p. 74).3 But Bradbury’s medical metaphor,
‘the Cheyne-Stokes respiration of civilization’ and
its omission from Fahrenheit 451 provide me with
the starting point for thinking about the role of
breath in the ‘technoscientiﬁc imaginary’.
‘The Cheyne-Stokes respiration of civilization’
conceives the disembodied jet sounds as a patho-
logical form of breathing. Cheyne-Stokes respir-
ation is named after two physicians: William Stokes
and John Cheyne. In Stokes’s The Diseases of
the Heart and Aorta (1854), there is an extensive
gloss on John Cheyne’s 1818 observation of the
breathing irregularities associated with damage to
respiratory centres and chronic heart failures.4
Cheyne-Stokes respiration is characterised by a
breathing cycle with three distinct phases. First, the
breath gradually increases its depth and rapidity;
then, it decreases this rapidity, eventually result-
ing in an apnoea or brief cessation. Following
Bradbury’s metaphor, civilisation breathes. That
breath is pathologically irregular and characterised
by speed-ups, slow-downs and crisis-stops.
Although it might equally describe today’s reliance
on crash capitalism, ‘the sound of today’ for
Bradbury, with his interest in Cold-War politics, is
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the ever-present, unseen war that disrupts the apparent stability
of his dystopia and eventually collapses its illusory peace. By
using the breathing cycle as the metaphor’s source, Bradbury
links the wider sociopolitical conditions of his anaesthetised
society to more intimate markers of personal unhappiness
(Mildred’s dependency on sleeping medication, Montag’s inabil-
ity to remember a time when he was happy). The metaphor is
not simply symbolic of connections between politics, health and
personal life; it also alerts the readers to an intermittent motif
of breath.
When Montag takes one of his illegal books to an acquaint-
ance, he, like the ‘giant’ mentioned above, must stand ‘catching
his breath’ after running away from an angry mob (p. 28).2
Catching a breath, holding a breath, increasing a breathing rate:
Bradbury uses these to gesture to the ways various bodies
exhibit their concern at the state’s ‘breathing problems’. This
problem is not simply a breathing pathology in the rhythm of
the state; breath is in itself a form of biopolitical control.
Montag realises, as he ﬂees the Mechanical Hound that tracks
him, that ‘the particles of his breathing might remain in an elec-
tronically detectable invisible cloud for hours after he had
passed on’ (p. 50).2 When, in the last pages of the novella,
Montag’s city is destroyed, the force of the explosion will leave
the rebel group he has joined, a group who seek to preserve the
books by each keeping a single page, chapter or text in their
heads, ‘gasping like ﬁsh’ (p. 60).2 This immanent destruction of
civilisation will leave them temporary inheritors of the
Cheyne-Stokes respiration, which gradually gives way to a new
normality: ‘You could hear them breathing fast, then slower,
then with the slowness of normality’ (p. 60).2 Even the ending
of The Fireman, juxtaposing quotes from the books of
Ecclesiastes and Job, Hamlet and ‘Ben Bolt’ with the immanent
declaration ‘Montag felt ﬁne’, implies, in its emphasis on the
normality of transience and mortality, a new awareness of the
need for slow breathing.
Fahrenheit 451 retains traces of this breath motif, but with
some critical differences. The rebels are also heard ‘breathing
fast, then slower, then slow…’, but ‘the slowness of normality’
has been replaced with an ellipsis (p. 155).3 The rebels are not
returning to normal; they are performing a strange form of
Cheynes-Stokes breathing (fast, slow, cease). The implications of
this relation between ‘death’ and ‘breath’ are evident early in
the novel, when Montag returns home for the ﬁrst time. The
room he shares with Mildred is described as ‘cold but nonethe-
less he felt he could not breathe […] with the feeling of a man
who will die in the next hour for lack of air, he felt his way
toward his open, separate, and therefore cold bed’ (p. 19).3
Mildred herself is introduced as someone whose only signs of
life are ‘the breath coming out of the nostrils’ (p. 20).3 In each
instance, breath is immanent to the body that breathes, rather
than normative and prescriptive: unlike The Fireman, Fahrenheit
451 does not make the metaphysical connection between the
pathologies of individual breathing patterns and the collapse of
civilisation explicit. The ‘Cheyne-Stokes respiration of civiliza-
tion’ is performed, rather than referenced.
Bradbury’s decision to eliminate direct allusions to breath
science from Fahrenheit 451 makes aesthetic sense, in that it
replaces ‘telling’ with ‘showing’. In Fahrenheit 451’s version of
the ‘Cheyne-Stokes’ passage, the loss of a mediating ‘she listens’
allows for a more subtle indirect discourse, which parallels the
sky’s emptiness with Mildred’s response: rather than her out-
burst in defence of her radio and television programmes
detailed in The Fireman, she simply ‘snatched the phone’ when
it rings in Fahrenheit 451, the quicker to return to her unhappy,
cloistered existence (p. 74).3 More generally, the novel inte-
grates ‘Cheyne-Stokes’ into its form, rather explicitly naming it
as a concept. Where The Fireman links breathing pathology to
civilisation explicitly, Fahrenheit 451 performs these irregular-
ities as a series of structural arrhythmias in the actions of the
characters and the expectations of their society. Bradbury
genders this arrhythmia in his treatment of Mildred, the hyster-
ical exemplar of her civilisation’s ‘Cheyne-Stokes’: she seeks
breathlessness simultaneously in high speed driving (which ‘tore
the breath from [Montag’s] mouth’), her ‘programmes’ (which
she sings along to ‘under her breath’) and in death (her
attempted suicide).3 By contrast, Montag’s stable, if perplexed,
progress from his ‘pleasure to burn’ to his acceptance that ‘to
everything there is a season’ orients itself towards a more
‘mindful’ pattern for everyday life. Mildred’s instability, paired
with Montag’s comparable stability, points to Bradbury’s prob-
lematic gender politics, since he seems to perpetuate particularly
nineteenth-century scientiﬁc corollaries between pathological
breath conditions, hysteria and the female subject. But the way
in which he integrates a breathing condition into the form of
the novel also opens up an alternative way of reading the role
for breath in SF, a way that exceeds or disrupts description
within the technoscientiﬁc imaginary.
THE TECHNOSCIENTIFIC IMAGINARY
In the ‘technoscientiﬁc imaginary’, or ‘the culturally-embedded
imagining of futures enabled by technoscientiﬁc innovation’,
breath risks being understood simply as a scientiﬁc process,
rather than anything that disrupts scientiﬁc discourse.5 Breath,
as object fact, yields itself to bald, empirical description. The
metaphysical problem of breath is easily ‘solved’ by scientiﬁc
process, as an answer to the empirical question asked of the
work, namely ‘how do the characters or personae breathe?’ By
no means a simple question, this ‘how’ encompasses the chemis-
try of what is breathed, its presence or absence from a particular
environment and the processes by which it is inhaled or
exhaled. Its bio-literary expediency is resolved by discoveries in
the ﬁeld of scientiﬁc concern.
The problem facing a technoscientifc aesthetic, particularly in
its relationship with medical science and emergent technologies,
is its presentation of technoscientiﬁc possibilities that themselves
take as given the translation of certain scientiﬁc ideologies into
scientiﬁc certainty. This manifests, in the case of breath, as a sci-
entiﬁc certainty whose predicates might be explored but whose
quiddity is not to be interrogated. Breath, the scientiﬁc process,
always threatens to obscure breath, the cultural network. A cor-
rective, proposed by Peter Adey, is what Marijn Nieuwenhuis
has called Adey’s
return to a revised and revived, pre-Socratic understanding of the
element of air. Such an ‘anterior’ position enables Adey to
decline temptations to reduce air to ‘geophysicalist epistemolo-
gies and ontologies’ and allows him to construct theorizations of
air as a ‘backgrounding condition, structure, or “force”, but also
and just as crucially, a method of afﬁnitive listening’. (p. 90)6
By returning, at least conceptually, to cultural understandings
of breath that are not underpinned by modern medical science,
we open ourselves to alternative, perhaps conﬂicting, forms of
understanding and articulating breath. For all its resemblance to
such movements, this conceptual rehabilitation of prior models
is not the correlative of either retrofuturism or steampunk: it is
neither a ‘detached sensibility that mourns the lost belief in pro-
gress’ nor retroﬁt valorisation of ‘a mode of productive labor
based on work with materials’ (pp. 249; 250).7 Rather, it
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responds to the scientiﬁc facticity of breath (exempliﬁed by, for
instance, ‘the Cheynes-Stokes respiration’ of The Fireman) with
the possibility that a scientiﬁc deﬁnition might be but one way
among many when responding to a particular experience that
might be better ‘shown’ than ‘told’.
A further rationale for opening up ‘alternative discourses’
emerges when we note that breath, itself, presents a challenge to
scientiﬁc realism. Conceptually, breath may be understood as a
series of binary opposites entangled by process. Interior meets
exterior as our lungs take in or give out air. Conscious and auto-
nomic functions blur as we either concentrate on controlling,
holding or releasing our breath or concede control to the regu-
lation of our bodies. Cartesian distinctions between mind and
body blur in the physiological and the spiritual understandings
of breath, as we breathe either to modulate mood or to pace
meditation. Even my use of ‘we’ is only possible because I
assume that you and I share the biological-spiritual imperative
to breathe. Breath transgresses, in its processes, the rigorous
divisions of its parts. This transgression is detectable as an echo
of scientiﬁc discourse in SF literature such as The Fireman and
Fahrenheit 451; in SF ﬁlm it emerges in a preference for affect-
ive sounds over scientiﬁc images.
BREATH AND FILM
Davina Quinlivan devotes a page of The Place of Breath in
Cinema (2012) to the ‘detached and scientiﬁc imagining of the
human body’ found in Paul Thomas Anderson’s Magnolia
(1999) (p. 8).8 The need to address the acoustic quality of
breath contributes to her decision not to explore the ‘technos-
cientiﬁc’ in greater detail. ‘Despite the visual impact of
Anderson’s microscopic images of respiration, they ultimately
offer limited scope for reﬂection beyond the representational
qualities of such images’ (p. 8).8 Quinlivan’s meditation on
Anderson’s respiratory montage, where a cancerous cell is
tracked in Earl Partridge’s body, demonstrates the importance of
thinking about breath’s temporalities, rather than its scientiﬁc
process. But Quinlivan explicitly links breath’s acoustic qualities
to SF in her discussion of Darth Vader from George Lucas’s Star
Wars (1977): ‘it is the strange “whooshing” sound of breathing
associated with the Darth Vader character that is at the core of
this iconic ﬁlm’ (p. 5).8 9
For Quinlivan, breath suggests ‘a mode of duality between the
material and the incorporeal’ and emphasises ‘the particular
unsettling of boundaries between vision and the unseen’ to
create ‘an intermediary internal sound between conscious
expression and involuntary, unintentional corporeality’ (pp. 3;
136).8 The result is an ‘(im)material’, ‘(in)visible’ ‘ﬁlmic pres-
ence’ (p. 3).8 This presence has a technoscientiﬁc explanation,
‘the sound of Darth Vader’s breathing functions as a prominent
reminder of his physical weakness’. ‘Yet, in spite of this knowl-
edge, the particular feelings of discomfort that may be experi-
enced by the viewer as a result of hearing Darth Vader’s
continuous, stiﬂed breath contained within the mask remain dif-
ﬁcult to explain’ (p. 5).8 Quinlivan proposes, by way of explan-
ation for this discomfort, the emphasis on Vader’s ‘living,
suffering human body which underscores the issue of mortality
in the ﬁlm’ (p. 6).8 While Star Wars provides an excellent die-
getic example for breath’s (in)visibility, Quinlivan argues that
the reliance on thinking breath as something that is heard allows
breath’s (im)materiality to be understood as something seen or
felt.
Given the complexity of her analysis, it is unfortunate that
Quinlivan, when looking at SF more generally, claims the genre
has a thematic preoccupation with scientiﬁc breathing at the
expense of more complex affective engagements, which she
ﬁnds ‘much more bound up’ in horror ﬁlms. In this regard,
Quinlivan regards Star Wars as exceptional in its exploration of
breath’s affect. Generally, ‘SF cinema is preoccupied with
oxygen’ (p. 24),8 ‘particularly through its thematic reference to
the air-lock or lack of oxygen’ (p. 23).8 The recurrence of the
airlock trope implies a technoscientiﬁc analysis of the need to
breathe within the structures of plot and narrative. The charac-
ter, locked out of ‘breathable space’, desires to re-enter this
space and makes a number of attempts to do so. The plot turns
on this character’s inability to breathe. Whatever other fantas-
tical postulates, the scientiﬁc economy of breath keeps charac-
ters bonded to the empirical process of breath, with her notion
of ‘ﬁlmic presence’ conspicuously absent. The implication is
that, for Quinlivan, the preoccupation that SF characters share
over breathing is distinctly technoscientiﬁc. Stanley Kubrick’s
2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) provides Quinlivan with one
such example, namely the scene where the computer, HAL
9000, locks the astronaut, Dave, out of the ship.10
Focusing on this moment, however, ignores the more compel-
ling instance of breath as acoustic supplement to the ﬁlm’s
visuals, particularly as it differentiates between respirable space
within the astronaut’s suit and irrespirable outer space. Breath
also functions as a rhythmic counterpoint to HAL’s melodious
rendition of 19th century music-hall song ‘Daisy’ as Dave deac-
tivates him. It also marks the stages of Dave’s life, given in
the succession of rooms that he visits. David W. Patterson notes
that this
musica humana becomes a signature ‘theme’ at those moments
when humankind’s identity is asserted in sharpest contradistinc-
tion to other elements in the environment, comprising speciﬁc-
ally confrontations with nature (as a lone astronaut ﬂoats in the
endlessness of space), technology (as the conﬂict between human
and machine culminates in HAL’s termination) and the alien or
‘other’ (as an astronaut who has ostensibly traversed space and
time lands inexplicably in a suite of rooms). (p. 462)11
Patterson’s attention to Kubrick’s musical treatment of breath-
ing sounds (the musica humana) demonstrates that, far from
being a scientiﬁc feature of the ﬁlm, breath becomes a metonym
for a peculiarly unscientiﬁc aspect of the human (epitomised by
Dave), expressed in its encounters with the non-human (repre-
sented by HAL 9000). 2001 provides a stimulating contrast
between the inhuman technoscientiﬁc and its human counter-
part. But the consequence of this dialectic is to re-establish a
dichotomy in which breath is understood through either the
technoscientiﬁc (as non-human) or the human (as extra-
technoscientiﬁc). To consider this dichotomy in a more useful
way, where the technoscientiﬁc and the extra-technoscientiﬁc
may be fused rather than contrasted and thus develop the haptic
aesthetic that Quinlivan ﬁnds in the more experimental cinema
of Atom Egoyan, David Cronenberg and Lars von Trier, I turn
to a ﬁnal visual-acoustic example from the SF ﬁlm: James
Cameron’s The Abyss (1989).12
THE ABYSS
The Abyss most obviously coordinates a relationship between
technoscientiﬁc breath and its extra-technoscientiﬁc corollary
when Ed Harris’ Bud Brigman prepares to descend the Cayman
Trough to disarm a Trident missile. Bud works on an experi-
mental underwater oil rig, which is appropriated by the US
Navy to retrieve the Trident missiles from a sunken US nuclear
submarine. His estranged wife, Lindsey Brigman, the designer
of the rig, joins the expedition, as do a number of US Navy
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Seals, the crew of the rig and the pet rat of one of the crewmen.
A storm severs their connection to the surface, even as one of
the Navy Seals, Hiram Coffey, begins to suffer paranoia induced
by high-pressure nervous syndrome. When it comes to light that
the sinking of the submarine was caused by the presence of non-
terrestrial intelligences (NTIs), Coffey attempts to blow up the
NTIs with one of the Trident missiles. A submarine battle
between the Brigmans and Coffey sees Coffey die in the trench,
but not before the missile sinks down to the NTIs’ city. Bud
must then descend the trench to disarm the missile. Sea pressure
at that level renders gaseous oxygen unbreathable. The ﬁlm’s
technoscientiﬁc solution to this dilemma is an oxygenated
ﬂuorocarbon emulsion, which will permit Bud to ‘breathe’ for a
limited period of time. Changing the ‘what’ (oxygenated emul-
sion) and the ‘how’ (liquid respiration) of Bud’s breathing
process resolves the problems posed by the alteration in envir-
onment. Fantasy becomes reality as the details of how Bud is to
breathe are explored in a series of small, yet important scenes.
Our introduction to liquid breathing occurs when the Navy
Seals ﬁrst arrive on the oil rig. Their dive master explains the
experimental dive equipment to the owner of the rat. To illus-
trate his explanation, he puts the rat into a cage, which he then
submerges in the emulsion. This sequence, cut from British ver-
sions of the ﬁlm because of perceived cruelty to animals, antici-
pates Bud’s immersion in the same liquid. Unlike those scenes
ﬁlmed with Harris, however, the rat really breathed the ﬂuoro-
carbon mixture: ‘what you see is a rat breathing a liquid. There
are no tricks, no special effects of any kind’ (p. 95).13 The tech-
noscientiﬁc ‘innovation’ of liquid breathing had already been
realised in 1989 by Johannes Kylstra. Kylstra, whom Cameron
consulted before the ﬁlm in 1987, published his ﬁndings on the
feasibility for humans to breathe through oxygenated ﬂuorocar-
bons in 1977, and his animal test studies date back to 1962.14
James Cameron recalls meeting Francis Falejczyk, the diver
Kylstra worked with, when he was 16 or 17 (between 1969 and
1971). The meeting led Cameron to write a short story, titled
‘The Abyss’, set in an underwater laboratory and premised on
the use of liquid breathing.13 Even at this time, he knew from
Falejczyk that Kylstra had concluded that, while divers might
use oxygenated ﬂuorocarbons at rest, the increased levels of
oxygen when at work would make the suitable oxygenated
ﬂuorocarbons prohibitively toxic. Falejczyk himself developed
pneumonia after the experiment. Certainly, while forms of
liquid breathing are used in neonatal care today, there is no suc-
cessful counterpart in adults, where relative lung space does not
allow for sufﬁcient absorption from full liquid immersion.
Liquid breathing, a pivotal feature of The Abyss, provides a pro-
vocative example of the technoscientiﬁc imaginary’s role in con-
sidering oxygenated ﬂuorocarbons as an emerging or future
medical technology.
The scientiﬁc limit for these questions is framed, then, as the
limits to which such technologies may be pushed. The ﬁlm, by
contrast, suggests that the discourses around emergent technolo-
gies are usefully opened up by considering their elective afﬁn-
ities with other, more literary, narratives. The clearest example
is to be found in parallel situations involving the rat, Bud and
Lindsey. The rat’s immersion in the ﬂuorocarbons anticipates
Bud’s immersion, implicitly linking the ‘experimental’ breathing
apparatus to the ethics of Kylstra’s animal/human testing proto-
cols. But both experiences also parallel Lindsey’s drowning.
Caught in a damaged submarine with only one air supply after
dispatching the psychopathic Coffey, Bud and Lindsey are faced
with the dilemma that they cannot both return to the oil rig.
Lindsey’s implausible solution is to drown herself. The low
temperature of the water will slow her possible brain damage,
providing Bud with the time necessary to return her to the rig
and revive her. This ‘resurrection narrative’ has an established
place in literary and theological traditions, but it also mimics the
change in state of both the rat and Bud. All three ‘drown’ in the
conventional sense of breathing in liquid but survive the process
because their environment has been transformed. In each situ-
ation, the environment changes from air to water, their breath-
ing changes as a result and the ﬁlm depicts both changes as
traumatic.
In all three situations, a scientiﬁc or personal explanation is
used to normalise the changes. The divemaster attempts to
ameliorate the trauma in the rat and, later, in Bud by repeating
that their violent responses to the change in environment (from
air to liquid) is either ‘completely normal’ or follows ‘a normal
adjustment period’, appealing to personal experience, ‘I’ve done
this myself ’ and overlaying the violence of the visual transform-
ation with a measured scientiﬁc narrative.12 As the camera
focuses on the rat, during her immersion in the emulsion, the
divemaster details what is happening:
He takes the ﬂuid into his lungs. He takes the ﬂuid into his
lungs. There he goes. Now there’s a bit of anxiety here. Now
he’s starting to relax. He’s ﬁne. See his chest moving. Getting
plenty of oxygen […] See, the ﬂuid’s harder to push in and out
than air. A little more work to breathe. He’s going to be ﬁne.
He’s digging it.12
The repetitions included in the description, combined with
the diminution of the anxiety and the rationalisation of appar-
ent difﬁculties, lend the divemaster’s voiceover the appearance
of objective scientiﬁc observation. The divemaster’s objectivity
may be less sympathetically understood as a lack of care, already
marked in his refusal to change his pronominal referent for the
rat from ‘he’ to ‘she’ despite repeated prompting. Rather than
easing the process, the divemaster’s explanation attempts to
efface the traumatic transformation by detailing the steps as a
straightforward progression. Resistance is recast as the simple
struggles of a creature unhabituated to this process. However,
neither tone nor stages can entirely erase the visual impact of
the trapped rat’s struggles as she clasps the cage before submit-
ting to the new breathing protocol. As the crewman owner of
the rat remarks, ‘she’s doing it, she ain’t digging it’.12 The scien-
tiﬁc ‘normality’ of liquid breathing, assumed by the divemaster,
is called into question by the sheer violence of Cameron’s pres-
entation of the transformation process.
This presentation is reiterated in the respective liquid immer-
sions of Lindsey (her drowning) and Bud (his mask is ﬁlled with
the emulsion). In each scene, the character repeats the rat’s
clasp. The camera focuses on Lindsey’s hand during her drown-
ing, as it phases from clutching Bud’s helmet to extending stifﬂy
in the visual equivalent of a death rattle, before relaxing out of
the frame. The hand’s gesticulation functions as a synecdoche
for Lindsey’s transformation from living, breathing body to
liquid-breathing corpse. It is the visual correlative to the inher-
ent resistance to breathing liquid. It recalls the rat’s clasp, while
anticipating Bud’s own attempts to grab hold of something as
his body resists the transubstantiation of air into liquid.
The aforementioned normative function of the scientiﬁc
explanation is to distract precisely this attention to the traumatic
grip. Lindsey gives a scientiﬁc explanation for drowning herself:
‘I can be revived after ten, ﬁfteen minutes’.12 When Bud transi-
tions from breathing air to breathing liquid, the divemaster
insists on the normality of the process: ‘Relax […] Don’t hold
your breath, take it in […] It’s perfectly normal. We all breathe
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liquid for nine months, Bud, your body will remember’.12 The
actual scientiﬁc content of these explanations is less important
than the dynamic they set up; in each instance, the traumatic
content of the lived experience of drowning is (inadequately)
explained away by discourses that seek a rational, technoscienti-
ﬁc solution to the problem presented. Breathing, explained as a
technoscientiﬁc function, does not adequately address affective
responses to the presentation of liquid breathing. The rat and
Bud may anticipate scientiﬁc advances in liquid ventilation when
they begin to breathe the emulsion, but focussing on this
novelty obscures the violence of the transition from one state of
breathing to another, recalled in Fulke Greville’s ‘Caelica 83’:
‘You that seek what life is in death,/Now ﬁnd it air that once
was breath’.15 The transition from life to death is understood
through the metaphor of breath transformed into air, since to
understand life through death, as the workings of bodies, is to
understand breath as simply, technoscientiﬁcally, a matter of air.
Greville’s associative chiasmus (his ﬁrst term, ‘life’, corresponds
to his fourth, ‘breath’, while his second term, ‘death’, corre-
sponds to his third, ‘air’) troubles any easy logic of transform-
ation: what life becomes in death (a corpse) can be correlated to
‘mere’ air only because the traumatic transitions of breath no
longer obtain. Adapting Greville’s insights to The Abyss, when
breath becomes liquid, we ﬁnd the transitionary violence from
life into death experienced by the rat, Lindsey and Bud, a vio-
lence whose ontological force is spent in a technoscientiﬁc
imaginary where the interchangeability of liquid and air are, as
the divemaster might say, ‘perfectly normal’.12
CONCLUDING REMARKS
My article addresses breath in SF by interrogating its appearance
in the technoscientiﬁc imaginary. There is a possible tautology
in scientiﬁc responses to breath, since breath may so easily be
understood in wholly scientiﬁc terms. This results in a potential
circularity in analyses that addresses the question of breathing in
SF exclusively through the technoscientiﬁc imaginary. If writers
are primarily concerned with realist portrayals what their char-
acters breathe, even technoscientiﬁc reconstructions of how
these characters breathe will maintain the ontological inference
that they either breathe or do not. In fact, far from providing
breath with a technoscientiﬁc support, or even advancing the
science of breathing in the technoscientiﬁc imaginary, SF draws
on breath as a ready correlative to embodied experience. It uses
breath, in its embodied sense, to blend into the technoscientiﬁc
imaginary, an extra-scientiﬁc affect. Breath is SF’s corrective to
the technoscientiﬁc imaginary, reﬁning articulated through care-
fully staged scientiﬁc explanations and the affective conditions
of haptic transformations and transubstantiations.
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